IC55skiC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 SKIDDIES, INC., 4 Plaintiff, New York, N.Y. 5 16 Civ. 8709 (BCM) V. 6 SELDAT, INC., et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 December 5, 2018 10:15 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. BARBARA C. MOSES, 12 Magistrate Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES 15 16 SACK & SACK, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 17 BY: MICHAEL H. MUI BY: ERIC STERN 18 19 MODELINE FENELON Attorney for Defendants 20 21 22 23 24 25

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(Case called)

MR. MUI: Michael Mui, Sack & Sack. Good morning, your Honor.

> THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. STERN: Eric Stern, Sack & Sack with Michael Mui.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. FENELON: Modeline Fenelon, general counsel for Seldat, 28 West 37th Street, New York, New York.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. FENELON: Good morning.

THE COURT: Counsel, as you know, we are here this morning for our final pretrial conference. The matter will be called for trial without a jury on December 12th, next Wednesday, at 9:30 in the morning. The purpose of today's conference is to review the parties' pretrial filings, to resolve any scheduling or evidentiary issues that can be resolved in advance, and of course to make sure that all of the attorneys understand what is expected of them and of their clients, both prior to and during the trial itself.

Excuse me one moment.

(pause)

THE COURT: Beginning with the parties' filings, I have the revised joint pretrial order. Does it remain satisfactory to both parties?

MR. MUI: Judge, I just want to point out that the

IC55skiC conference deposition designations made by defendants is basically a 1 wholesale designation of the entire transcript. 2 3 THE COURT: I have read through it, counsel. 4 MR. MUI: That's it. 5 THE COURT: Does any party wish to make any changes or modifications to their own portion, or their own as set forth 6 7 in the pretrial order? MR. MUI: No, your Honor. 8 9 MS. FENELON: No, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Give me one minute. 11 I also have five direct testimony affidavits. 12 the complete set, correct, and everybody is happy with their 13 direct testimony affidavits? 14 MR. MUI: Yes, your Honor. 15 MS. FENELON: Yes. THE COURT: I have received no motions in limine, the 16 17 time for such motions having come and gone. I just want to

make sure I didn't miss anything. Nobody filed any, correct?

That's correct, Judge. MR. MUI:

MS. FENELON: No.

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THE COURT: And I have two sets of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for which I thank you. The remaining parties, as I understand it, are for the plaintiffs are Skiddies, Inc., Mr. Franco, and among the defendants we have Seldat, Inc., Seldat Distribution, Inc., California,

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Seldat Distribution, Inc., New Jersey, and Mr -- help me 1 2 pronounce his name? 3 MS. FENELON: Daniel Dadoun. 4 THE COURT: -- Mr. Dadoun; the remaining defendants, 5 having been dismissed after the plaintiffs advised me that they 6 were not pursuing claims against them. I guess they may not 7 even exist. I'm not sure what the story is there. So, those are our remaining parties. And in terms of 8 9 the claims and counterclaims, the plaintiffs have withdrawn 10 their fourth cause of action and the defendants have withdrawn their third counterclaim. 11 12 Are we all on the same page? 13 MS. FENELON: Yes. 14 MR. MUI: Yes. 15 THE COURT: I would like to spend some time with you this morning talking first about the witnesses which are listed 16 17 in the joint pretrial order. I will assume, unless you tell me 18 otherwise, that each party is planning to call each of the 19 witnesses that are listed in the JPTO, right? They're all 20 going to be here, correct? 21 MR. MUI: Yes. 22 THE COURT: For plaintiff? 23 MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: All your named witnesses will be here?

MR. MUI: Judge, the only scheduling issue, I don't

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1 know if you want to discuss.

THE COURT: Not yet. First tell me if they're going to be in my courtroom next week.

MR. MUI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: For defendants as well?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: Which means that the opposing party, which wishes to cross-examine these witnesses, need not issue a trial subpoena, correct? They're going to be here.

MR. MUI: Correct.

THE COURT: They're going to be here?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: If I should find that some witness, who the other side expect to cross-examine has not shown up, there will be consequences for that. If any difficulty should arise with respect to any of the witnesses that you expect, please let me know the instant the issue makes itself known to you.

In terms of witness testimony, witnesses whose direct testimony was submitted by affidavit, which in this case is all of the witnesses with the exception of Mr. Franco in his capacity as a defense adverse witness, but in every other instance, these witnesses will not be permitted to offer additional direct testimony from the stand. What that means is when you call your witness you are limited, once he is sworn in, to confirming his name and the authenticity of his original

1 affidavit which you should offer into evidence at that time.

You may then ask the witness to confirm that everything he said

in his affidavit is true and correct. That's pretty much it.

You will then tender the witness for cross-examination.

Anything else you want to elicit from your witness will have to

await redirect and redirect will, of course, be governed by the

usual rule, namely that the redirect examination will be

limited by the scope of the cross-examination.

I do want to address specifically the situation of Mr. Franco who is listed as -- who is a plaintiff, who is a plaintiff's witness, who has submitted an affidavit constituting his direct testimony in support of plaintiff's case-in-chief but who is also listed as an adverse witness for the defendants. I see no reason, particularly in a bench trial, to call anyone to the stand more than once. Therefore, in the case of Mr. Franco, I will both permit and expect Defense counsel to conduct his cross-examination and his adverse witness direct examination in the same session. The plaintiff may then conduct redirect as to its case-in-chief and cross-examination as to the counterclaims and, if appropriate, I will then give the defendant one more turn to conduct redirect as to the counterclaims.

So, we may go back and forth four times with respect to Mr. Franco because he is testifying in a dual role, so-to-speak. I would like to get preliminary estimates, if the

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parties are able to give them to me today, as to how much time
they think they are going to require really starting with the
defendant, because we are talking cross-examination time now.
         So, you will be cross-examining three witnesses,
correct? What's your time estimate?
        MS. FENELON: Bear with me, your Honor?
        THE COURT: Sure.
        MS. FENELON: Is it three witnesses or only two?
        THE COURT: Maybe it is only two, Franco and Hannon,
right?
        MS. FENELON: Yes.
        THE COURT: I misspoke.
        MS. FENELON: Your Honor, I am still thinking about
the time frame but I don't think it should be more than three
hours.
        THE COURT: Three hours per?
        MS. FENELON: Two hours per.
         THE COURT: Two hours per. All right. So that's four
hours of cross-examination time.
        And plaintiff's counsel, you have three defense
witnesses to cross-examine.
        MR. MUI: Yes.
        THE COURT: Any estimate?
                  I think Mr. Dadoun would be two, three
        MR. MUI:
hours, and I think the other two would be no more than an hour.
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THE COURT: So, sounds like a maximum of five hours. 1 2 MR. MUI: Right. 3 THE COURT: So that's a total of approximately nine 4 hours of cross-examination. I'm going to add in a little bit 5 of padding on that for redirect and it sounds like we should be 6 able to get the testimony done in two days. 7 Do you agree, plaintiffs? MR. MUI: Yes, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Defendants? 10 MS. FENELON: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Do I need to give each side a time limit 12 in order to make sure that we get done within those two days? 13 I don't think that's necessary for us. MR. MUI: 14 THE COURT: Defense? 15 MS. FENELON: No. THE COURT: If I see the cross-examination or the 16 17 redirect examination going substantially beyond the estimates 18 that I heard today, I may have to reconsider that. So, I know 19 you will do your best to be as efficient as possible. 20 Now, counsel, you said that there was a scheduling issue as to one witness? 21 22 MR. MUI: Right. 23 THE COURT: Now is the time to bring that up. 24 MR. MUI: I have been in contact with Mr. Hannon. 25 he going to be out of the country next week and the week after.

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He said his first availability to be in New York would be the first week of January.

THE COURT: The trial will be over before the first week of January.

MR. MUI: I understand that, Judge.

THE COURT: We scheduled this trial months ago. We rescheduled this trial at whose request was it?

MS. FENELON: Ours.

THE COURT: At the defendant's request. If Mr. Hannon is not available to come to court and be cross-examined then his direct testimony will not be admitted and he will not be a part of the evidentiary record adduced at this trial.

Why can't you get him here?

MR. MUI: He is going to be out of the country traveling, Judge.

THE COURT: Why didn't you find that out when we were scheduling the trial?

MR. MUI: I reached out to him. I received no indication that he wouldn't be available. After we submitted the pretrial order I reached out to him again and he said he may be away, and then I got confirmation that he was going to be away out of the country.

THE COURT: Well, you are out of luck, sir. So that brings us down to a total of four witnesses so we definitely ought to get the trial done in two days.

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Any other scheduling issues with witnesses? 1 MS. FENELON: None, Judge. 2 3 THE COURT: Plaintiff? 4 MR. MUI: No, Judge. 5 THE COURT: Of the remaining witnesses, looking at the defendant witnesses here, it is Hunt, Cooper and Dadoun, are 6 7 they all party affiliated witnesses? I can't remember. Seldat, Seldat. So, there are no non-party witnesses 8 9 so there will not be an application to exclude witnesses from 10 the courtroom, correct? 11 MR. MUI: Correct. 12 MS. FENELON: Correct. 13 THE COURT: So they can all sit in, as far as that 14 They may not be interested in sitting in but there goes. 15 doesn't seem to be a prohibition on it. Let me turn to the question of exhibits. I see that 16 17 there is no objection to most of the proposed exhibits and yet, for reasons that remain mysterious to me, I do not have a 18 stipulation as to never mind admissibility, I don't have the 19 20 stipulation as to authenticity, in other words the stipulation 21 that would permit the parties to bring copies of e-mails and 22 contracts rather than laboriously going through the 23 foundational drill for each and every piece of paper.

Mr. Witness, do you recognize this document?

Mr. Witness, is this a true and correct printout of an

e-mail that you sent on the date and time stated on the namer

e-mail that you sent on the date and time stated on the paper to the recipients listed on page 1?

Do we really want to be doing that, counsel, for each and every exhibit? I will direct this question to defense counsel, who I understand was the one unwilling to stipulate.

MS. FENELON: That issue did not come to my understanding on stipulation. I don't believe I discussed that stipulation.

understanding, it must be because you didn't read my orders, in which I not once, but twice, specifically encouraged the parties to stipulate to, among other things, authenticity and admissibility of documents. For example, at docket no. 153, which was an order that I issued on October 3rd I wrote:

Surely -- no, I take it back. In this one I wrote: The parties can agree on basic facts underlying this action which I remain mystified about and surely they can agree on who sent what relevant e-mails to whom on what date.

But no, counsel?

MS. FENELON: I didn't read that. I'm sorry for that. I would have to go through the e-mails again to make a decision on that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Look. If you are unable to stipulate to, at a minimum, authenticity, and preferably admissibility as to the documents that there is no objection to, then you are both

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going to be in technical difficulty because your cases in chief do not get the job done. Your affidavits constituting your witnesses' direct testimony do not authenticate and therefore are not sufficient to place into evidence any of the relevant documents, not the e-mails, not the contracts, not the invoices, not anything else, as far as I am concerned.

So, you could both find yourself in an awkward situation if the other side wanted to play chicken with you where instead of cross-examining there is a motion to dismiss for failure to make a prima facie case.

I don't think litigation should be game of gotcha. I want to get to the merits and I am sure you do, as well. If you were, for example, to stipulate to the admissibility of all of the exhibits other than the ones for whom objections have been listed in the pretrial order, you would not be conceding materiality, relevance, or probative value. You would simply be speeding things up so that they could become a part of the record, reserving all objections as to whether they mean what the other side says they mean and whether they help prove the other side's case or not.

I will encourage the parties, between now and next Wednesday, to reconsider this issue and I will, in particular, encourage the parties to agree at the outset of the trial, if they are able to do so, that all of the unobjected to exhibits may be admitted, reserving argument concerning relevance,

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weight, probative value, and so forth. If you are able to so stipulate, I will admit all of the unobjected to exhibits at the beginning of the trial. You may then simply use them as you see fit in your cross-examination or in your redirect examination, including arguing, if you wish to do so, that they don't mean what the other side says they mean, or that they don't show what the other side says they show, or so forth and so on.

If you don't stipulate to these foundational matters, then every time you pick up a document you are going to have to go through the drill and if it's not an original, if you are not planning on bringing the original -- e-mails don't really have originals but some of the other documents here have originals, you can expect all kinds of annoying evidentiary objections like best evidence rule and where is the original. I don't think we want to try the case on those kinds of issues. I think we want to get to the issues.

Any questions?

MS. FENELON: I will consider.

THE COURT: So, I would encourage both sides to seriously consider making some provision for getting the exhibits admitted in a more efficient manner.

Is anyone serving trial subpoenas for documents? imagine not.

MR. MUI: No, Judge.

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THE COURT: All right.

So, in terms of the logistics of the exhibits, the joint pretrial order says to bring a binder to the first day of I'm going to revise that now. I am going to ask that one day before trial, in other words by next Tuesday, please, I would like each party to provide the opposing party and the Court, delivered directly to chambers -- don't go through the clerk's office -- a tabbed loose-leaf binder containing copies of all of the exhibits listed by that side in the joint pretrial order tabbed, I quess it is, 1, 2, 3, for the plaintiff, A, B, C for the defendant, and I want them pre numbered. I want them to say on them that this is Plaintiff's 1, Plaintiff's 2, Defendant's A, Defendant's B, so that if I take it out of the binder I still know what it is. And, in fact, the Court will appreciate two copies of the binder, if counsel don't mind, so that my clerk can have one and I can have one up here on the bench.

If we are not stipulating to the admission of exhibits, then in addition to what is in the binders, you will have to bring the original or the closest to an original that you have, of each and every exhibit that you plan to move into admission, and we will have to go through them one by one and you will have to lay a foundation and you will have to move the exhibit into evidence and I will have to ask if there are any objections and then, if I say it is in evidence, it is in

evidence. If we have a stipulation, we can all work out of the binders.

Clear on that?

MR. MUI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

One more binder, sorry. I know the binders are multiplying, but I'm going to be an optimist and assume the parties are likely to reach a stipulation here in which case we will need a binder for the witness that can just sit on the witness stand so you don't have to keep handing exhibits to the witnesses, you can just say, turn to tab this, or turn to that tab.

MR. MUI: You want that on Tuesday as well?

THE COURT: I guess you don't have to bring that one until Wednesday, but if you are in the binder-making business, you might as well make them all on the same day so you know they all have the same things in them.

MR. MUI: Understood.

THE COURT: Also, if you can find it within you to cooperate and make a single binder, which contains both plaintiff's and defense, I think everybody will be happier down the road.

Now, the binder should include not just the exhibits, P1 through P whatever, and Defendant A through defendant whatever, but they should also include copies of each of the

moving affidavits, each of the direct testimony affidavits, and the designated deposition excerpts.

Let's talk about deposition excerpts for a moment and I will now ask defense counsel, under what theory is Mr. Franco's entire deposition transcript, both admissible over the hearsay objection which it is because he is a party opponent, but what makes it relevant?

MS. FENELON: Your Honor, my deposition is not long at all, it is about probably 60-something pages, and at the time that I was drafting the joint order I was still deciding as to which part exactly that I was going to bring in and, to be honest, your Honor, and I am still comparing the deposition transcript over his affidavit and I am in a position to go over the pages exactly and give a limited amount of numbers as to what part of the transcript I want to bring into --

THE COURT: You understand, I trust, Ms. Fenelon, the difference between using a deposition transcript as evidence as part of your case-in-chief and using it to impeach? You don't need to pre-designate passages that you intend to use to impeach the witness, you can do that in the traditional impeachment fashion. But, if you simply want to proffer testimony from the deposition transcript as part of your case-in-chief, then that needs to be pre-designated.

Are you asking me to give you another opportunity to do that?

1 MS. FENELON: Yes, please.

THE COURT: All right. This Friday you will serve on opposing counsel and you will file with the Court your proposed deposition excerpts from Mr. Franco's deposition testimony for purposes other than impeachment and the defendants can tell me on the morning of trial whether they have any objections to those excerpts or not. What I intend to do with respect to unobjected to deposition excerpts does not require counsel to read them into the record or to simply take them since this is a bench trial in written form, and they will then become part of the record and I will review them prior to issuing any findings of fact and conclusions of law. Okay?

MS. FENELON: Should I deliver this to chambers or -THE COURT: Let's see. The joint pretrial, this is
really sort of a supplement to the joint pretrial order so I
think you can file it on ECF.

MS. FENELON: Okay.

THE COURT: In order to get the ECF staff to take it and to understand what it is you probably want to call it something like a supplement to joint pretrial order to the court and hopefully they will take it.

MS. FENELON: Thank you.

THE COURT: If not, we will figure out some other way of getting it.

Does anyone need electronic computers of any sort for

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the computer projectors, overhead, laptop. 1 2 MR. MUI: One laptop. 3 THE COURT: Is that for counsel? 4 MR. MUI: Just for counsel. 5 THE COURT: Ms. Fenelon? 6 MS. FENELON: No. 7 THE COURT: In order to get permission to bring a laptop into the court all you need to do is fill out a -- what 8 9 is that form called, Mr. Snell? 10 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Electronic order. THE COURT: It is on Magistrate Moses' web page, there 11 12 is a form of the order. You submit it to us, I sign it, I 13 don't put it on ECF, I provide it directly to building security 14 staff and you walk in with your laptop. Conduct of trial. Let's take a few minutes to discuss 15 the conduct of trial. We are going to start at 9:30 in the 16 17 morning. I would like to start at 9:30 both days. Do either 18 counsel plan to make an opening statement? 19 MR. MUI: I was going to defer to your Honor if your 20 Honor requires one or prefers not. 21 THE COURT: I do not require it in a bench trial where 22 I have proposed finding of fact and conclusions of law. I just 23 assume you call your first witness. 24 MR. MUI: I don't think it is necessary.

THE COURT: Ms. Fenelon?

MS. FENELON: Same.

THE COURT: So, no opening statements, first witness should be ready to testify at 9:30. We may have a few housekeeping matters first but they shouldn't take very long and we will keep to that schedule on Thursday, and if we need to have a Friday we will keep to that schedule on Friday as well, be here at 9:30. Testimony will be generally taken for approximately an hour and a half, then we will take a break, then another hour to hour and a half, then we will take a break for lunch. We will try to make the lunch break begin somewhere between 12:30 and 1:00, but depending on how the testimony is coming in I can't guarantee a specific lunch break time. And then we will have two sessions again in the afternoon, each lasting roughly an hour or to an hour and a half with a short break in the middle of the afternoon.

If at any time during trial some emergency prevents counsel's prompt attendance at 9:30 in the morning and at whatever time a lunch break ends, please immediately call either the courtroom, and I am going to give you the courtroom number, it is 212 -- Kevin, make sure I give them the correct courtroom number -- 805-

THE DEPUTY CLERK: 0171.

THE COURT: Ah, 0171. And if there is no answer in the courtroom, call chambers. I think you already have the chambers number.

If you should discover between now and next Wednesday or at some time during the trial that you will be unable to comply with our schedule, again, let us know right away and not later.

Order of witnesses. You are down to one witness so I guess he is going to be your first, second, third and last witness, correct?

MR. MUI: All of them, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

How about the defendant? Because you are going to be on that afternoon, I imagine.

MS. FENELON: Yes. Will I be cross-examining Franco after he -- will you be examining Franco first?

THE COURT: We just went over that, counsel.

He will be placed under oath, he will confirm that his affidavit testimony is his and is true and correct, and then he will be turned over to you both for cross-examination and for such adverse examination as you wish to conduct of him in support of your counterclaims.

MS. FENELON: Yes. I understand that part, your Honor. Bear with me.

Is it, will he be presenting me the witness in the morning, 9:00 a.m.?

THE COURT: 9:30.

MS. FENELON: Okay, yes. That was my question.

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THE COURT: So, you should be prepared to start 1 cross-examining/examining Mr. Franco at about 9:40 in the 2 3 morning, I imagine, if we are not delayed. All right? 4 MS. FENELON: Okay. 5 THE COURT: So he perhaps will be done by lunch. Who is your first witness? 6 7 MS. FENELON: It would be Dadoun. THE COURT: Dadoun first? 8 9 MS. FENELON: Dadoun first. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MS. FENELON: Aaron Hart. 12 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Say again? 13 MS. FENELON: Aaron Hart, and Wesley Cooper. 14 THE COURT: Cooper last. 15 How many of those will you have available on Wednesday? 16 17 MS. FENELON: I can have all of them here if you --18 THE COURT: I don't think you are going to need all 19 I think you may need two, though. three. 20 MS. FENELON: Okay. 21 THE COURT: What do plaintiffs think about that? 22 MR. MUI: I think it is safe for two, Judge. 23 THE COURT: So, you can, if you wish, just make sure 24 that Mr. Dadoun and Mr. Hunt are available on the afternoon of 25 the 12th and we can reserve Mr. Cooper for the 13th. We may

not get through both of them, but better to have them here and not get to them than to not have them here and be looking around at 3:00 in the afternoon and have no witnesses left.

If the order of your witnesses changes, counsel, let your opposing counsel and the Court know as soon as you know.

We don't want any surprises. We are not having trial by ambush here.

You may question a witness either from counsel table where you are sitting now or from the lectern, if you wish. If it is necessary to approach the witness or the bench, please request permission from the Court to do so. Only one counsel may be heard, per side, per witness. That's an issue for the plaintiffs, I don't think that's an issue for the defendant because you are the trial counsel, correct?

MS. FENELON: I am, but I will be having general counsel here.

THE COURT: That's fine, but will she be participating in the trial or accompanying you?

MS. FENELON: We hadn't planned. If we were going to do opening statement, but I don't think so, no.

THE COURT: All right, because she's the lawyer who recently made an appearance in the case.

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: Tell me now if you want her to play a role as trial counsel. You don't.

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1 MS. FENELON: Yes, please.

THE COURT: You don't need my permission if she is going to be client representative but if she is going to be getting up and talking, tell me now.

MS. FENELON: I would love to leave that open, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well.

MS. FENELON: If it is possible.

THE COURT: Okay. The rule is one lawyer per witness per side, so the lawyer who does the cross will also do the redirect of that particular witness and will also do any objecting in relation to that witness and so on.

Understood?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

Speaking objections are prohibited. If you object, say the word "objection" followed by one or a very small number of words to indicate the nature of the objection. For example: "Objection. Hearsay." "Objection. Rule 403." I don't want to hear a paragraph here because I don't want the witness to be advertently or inadvertently coached as to the nature of counsel's concern.

I will not ordinarily hear argument beyond that on an evidentiary issue while the witness is on the stand. If some unanticipated evidentiary issue comes up that was not raised in

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advance, counsel should ask the Court to excuse the witness while the matter can be argued. I don't want to argue it at side bar or try to keep our voices to a whisper so that the witness doesn't hear what we are saying or those kinds of things.

Persons at counsel table, including counsel and their clients and their witnesses, shall not make gestures, facial expressions, audible comments, or other peanut gallery type responses to the testimony while it is going in. I make this point in particular because I understand there is a fair degree of personal animosity between the clients in play here and I don't want to see that demonstrated by word or gesture in the I want everybody to behave themselves appropriately courtroom. for Federal District Court.

Ouestions to the witnesses should not summarize or repeat the witness' prior testimony except to the minimal extent necessary to put the current question in context.

None of the witnesses need an interpreter, correct, plaintiffs?

MR. MUI: Correct.

THE COURT: Defendants?

MS. FENELON: Correct.

THE COURT: Both parties wish to close, yes?

MR. MUI: Briefly, yes.

Okay. So, we will use claims and THE COURT:

counterclaims here which means I kind of get to pick. I will have the defendant close first, followed by the plaintiff. If I permit rebuttal at that point it will be brief and I will permit brief rebuttal closings for both sides limited to any argument that counsel could not reasonably have anticipated

The requirement of contemporaneous objection will apply to closing arguments.

that was shared from the opposing side.

Any chance that this case is going to settle between now and next week and anything I can do to help that process?

Plaintiff?

MR. MUI: Judge, I just spoke to Ms. Fenelon before this conference and we did discuss this topic and we thought it would be helpful if, when both of our clients are present, we could have a conversation with you, perhaps, you speaking with the clients. I think that would be a significant improvement in the client's positions for both sides here. I'm not sure when your Honor would conduct such a session. We were thinking, since we had three days blocked off and we didn't think it would take a full three days to do the bench trial, perhaps before we started on Wednesday morning we could take whatever session we could take to see if there was a possibility of that. I know my client would welcome the opportunity for resolution and I think we are finally at a point where perhaps there is something that can be done here,

but I think we need or we want your Honor's help with pushing the ball down the hill a little bit.

THE COURT: And recognizing that you have consented to my jurisdiction for all purposes and therefore that I am your trial judge who will enter a final judgment after trial in this matter, you consent to my also acting in the capacity of mediator?

MR. MUI: Absolutely, Judge.

THE COURT: Ms. Fenelon?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: You consent to that as well?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: Well, I wish you would have come to me earlier and we could have scheduled something in that might have a more robust chance of helping the parties out here.

But, given that we are down one witness and I think we can comfortably handle the remaining witnesses in two or at most three days, I will if the parties so request, set aside two hours — two hours on Wednesday morning, from 9:30 to 11:30, to discuss settlement off the record before trial commences. So, I will now modify the commencement time of trial until 11:30 in the morning, we will not need a court reporter until 11:30, but we will meet in the courtroom at 9:30 to see what we can do settlement—wise. Your client representative will be

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| 1 | M | R. MUI | : Yes, | Judge. |
|---|---|--------|--------|--------|
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THE COURT: Your client representative will be Mr. Dadoun?

MS. FENELON: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: I will expect you to tell me at the beginning of the settlement conference portion of the day that you have engaged in a good faith bilateral meet and confer effort before you got here, so you should talk to each other at least one more time between now and then, and I will expect you to report to me on what the state of splay, what the current offer is and what the counteroffer is. I expect you each to make at least one real offer or counteroffer before you get here on Wednesday morning. At this late date with trial literally going to begin in two hours I may be of assistance as a gap closer but don't expect me to get you from zero to 60 in those two hours.

Do you understand what I am telling you?

MR. MUI: Understood, Judge.

THE COURT: I would like to take a little bit of time, and this may actually be helpful to counsel as you talk to your own clients, about settlements to chat with counsel about some of the legal and evidentiary issues in your case.

To begin with, are we going to have stipulation that

New York Law applies because I see that both sides have cited

New York Law in their proposed finding of fact and conclusions

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of law even though many of the events in question and some of the entities in question are or were in New Jersey. Plaintiffs?

MR. MUI: I would stipulate to New York Law.

THE COURT: Defendant?

MS. FENELON: As well, your Honor.

THE COURT: The parties have stipulated to the applicability of New York Law. That is helpful. Thank you very much.

The plaintiffs' first cause of action is characterized as a verbal agreement with respect to the plaintiff's entitlement to 5 percent of the revenues from new clients and I think 2 percent of the revenues of ongoing clients.

MR. MUI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: There actually appears to be a written contract to that effect, the 2012 letter agreement. Can plaintiff explain to me why you are pleading that as an oral contract claim?

MR. MUI: Judge, it is Mr. Franco's position and that it was outlined his affidavit as well that while he requested a written contract, he never received one. The employment agreement that was presented as an exhibit or that will be presented as an exhibit, it is his position that, yes, that's his signature on that document, correct, but he did not sign that document. That's always been his position. He was never

1 presented with that document. 2 THE COURT: It is his position that someone affixed a 3 facsimile of his signature to the document? MR. MUI: Correct. 4 5 THE COURT: It is fraudulent, in other words? MR. MUI: Correct. 6 7 THE COURT: That's his claim. MR. MUI: Yes. 8 9 THE COURT: That's a strong charge. 10 MR. MUI: I understand. THE COURT: What is the evidence for it? 11 12 MR. MUI: Other than Mr. Franco saying that he never 13 received that and signed that, that's --14 THE COURT: Let me ask you a closely-related question, and potentially more important question. What is the 15 difference between the written terms of this March 9th, 2012 16 17 contract and the oral contract that your client alleges? 18 MR. MUI: I believe, Judge, the language in the 19 employment agreement surrounding when that payment would have 20 been due, the 5 percent, let's say, Mr. Franco's position is 21 that when the clients were billed by Seldat he was entitled to 22 that commission. I don't believe the agreement says that. 23 THE COURT: Well, the agreement uses the term "net

THE COURT: Well, the agreement uses the term "net invoices paid."

MR. MUI: Right.

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THE COURT: Which I take it means --1 MR. MUI: Actively received payment. 2 3 THE COURT: -- which I take it means Mr. Franco and 4 his company get their cut when Seldat gets paid and not when 5 the customer is billed. 6 Is that the primary area of disagreement between the 7 parties? 8 MR. MUI: I believe that's the primary difference, 9 Judge. 10 THE COURT: What business, in its right mind, would 11 pay commissions before the money is in the bank? When I was a 12 partner in a law firm and I was on something akin to a 13 commission arrangement I didn't get paid until the clients paid 14 their bills. I don't know how it works in your law firm, you 15 don't have to tell me, but common sense does play a role here. So, what's the argument going to be? 16 17 MR. MUI: His argument is going to be that's what his agreement with Mr. Dadoun was, that it's when clients were 18 billed. And there were issues with when clients were receiving 19 20 billings and invoices. There is testimony from Mr. Dadoun 21 saying that he didn't even start reviewing these invoices and 22 billing until two years later after Mr. Franco began his 23 relationship there.

Other than that, Judge, I understand that common sense does come into play here and when I first heard it as well I

did a double-take but that's his position; that if it wasn't when the payments were supposed to be made or after they were received it was after Seldat billed the client he was entitled to that.

THE COURT: Is there going to be any evidence for this point other than your client's testimony?

MR. MUI: Not that I'm aware of, Judge.

THE COURT: So it is going to be his word against

Mr. Dadoun's word and possibly the word of the defendant's

other witnesses. What is the parties' custom and practice

going to show? The party's custom and practice, at least

through the time that the relationship is preserved, is going

to be that commissions were paid when client funds were

received, correct?

MR. MUI: Correct.

THE COURT: Correct. So understand you are going to have an uphill battle on that claim.

MR. MUI: Understood.

THE COURT: Turning to the defendants, with respect to that contract claim, Ms. Fenelon --

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- you have, somewhat mysteriously to me, pleaded a number of equitable defenses to the first cause of action which is not an equitable cause of action, it is a contract cause of action so laches, waiver, estoppel, unclean

hands. Are these even applicable to a breach of contract claim brought within the statute of limitations?

MS. FENELON: It is moreso to the breach of covenants of clean hands -- breach of covenants of good faith.

THE COURT: Same problem. That's a quasi contract claim. So, you should consider whether those defenses are going to do you any good in the context of the contract or the quasi contract claim. And there is no statute of limitations argument, correct? There is a long statute of limitations and --

MR. MUI: Not that I'm aware of, Judge.

THE COURT: What's the statute of limitations on an oral contract in New York?

MR. MUI: Six years.

THE COURT: Okay.

So, there may not be a statute of limitations defense and, in any event, it hasn't been pleaded and it is not in the findings of fact and conclusions of law so that is water under the bridge.

With respect to the breach of covenant claim, can you give me your elevator speech on that, plaintiffs, keeping in mind that, you know, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a substitute for every episode of allegedly substandard performance that doesn't actually breach a term of the contract. You have to do more than say the defendant

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essentially have to allege conduct which was designed to and had the effect of preventing the plaintiff from enjoying the mutually agreed upon benefits of the contract and how are you

didn't do a very good job with their side of the contract. You

going to quite get there?

Judge, I recognize that the covenant is MR. MUI: implied on almost every breach of contract case you have.

THE COURT: And it drops out before verdict in almost every breach of contract case that gets tried.

MR. MUI: I understand. I believe there are circumstances here that when Mr. Franco agreed to provide services to Seldat through his company, there was that implied covenant of good faith where, after Mr. Franco would provide a client or a customer to Seldat, I think it was implied that Seldat would do or use its best efforts to invoice properly, invoice on time, manage the services, make sure that products didn't go missing, just basic things that --

THE COURT: Does your client allege, and if so can your client prove that Seldat failed to do these things not out of general incompetence or even negligence, but as part and parcel of an intentional effort to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit to the bargain?

MR. MUI: As it goes to the managing of the services, probably not. I think that is probably more incompetence than anything else. But, as it turns to perhaps the late invoicing

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of clients which directly affected Mr. Franco's payment of commissions, I think there can be an argument to be made there that the fact that Mr. Dadoun didn't review these invoices and didn't send out invoices for a long period of time that could be argued as a breech of that covenant of good faith. That goes beyond just incompetence, that might go towards a willful nature.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we will have to see if there is evidence to support that theory.

Do both parties agree, incidentally, that plaintiff's entitlement to commissions ended when the relationship was terminated or does the plaintiff have a claim that he is entitled to residuals, so to speak?

MR. MUI: Judge, I believe he initially had a claim for the residuals but sitting here today, that's also something that moving forward I would move forward on the commissions that were due.

THE COURT: So, your estimate of contract damages, which is, remind me 2-point-something-million dollars, right?

MR. MUI: 2.9.

THE COURT: 2.9 million dollars.

So, in your view, that is simply your client's contractually agreed upon percentage of the charges billed to the customers for which he was entitled to commission during the time that he was on contract with the defendant?

1 MR. MUI: Yes.

THE COURT: And the defendant's position is, I assume, multi-layered; first, that he was entitled to commission only on revenues booked, not -- or I should say bills paid, not bills sent out; and second, there is a dispute as to which clients he was entitled to commission on, at least in one substantial instance.

The written letter agreement makes a distinction between new accounts and maintenance accounts. Do the parties agree on what that distinction means? In other words, if an account already belonged to Seldat before Mr. Franco came on board, was he entitled to 2 percent on that client along as it remained a client during his tenure.

MR. MUI: Are you talking pursuant to that agreement?

THE COURT: Well, both the oral and the written

agreements, the alleged oral and the alleged written

agreements, as the party describes them, make this distinction;

5 percent on new accounts and 2 percent on maintenance

accounts.

MR. MUI: Yes.

THE COURT: I am trying to figure out what the distinction between the two categories of accounts is and if the parties agree on what they are.

I will hear from plaintiffs first.

MR. MUI: Right, Judge.

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conference Plaintiff's position is that it would be entitled to commissions on only accounts that were introduced to Seldat that did not have a prior relationship with Seldat. THE COURT: And that he got 5 percent on those. MR. MUI: Right. THE COURT: So long as they remained accounts or at some point did they toggle over from being new accounts to being maintenance accounts? MR. MUI: It is our position that it would always be 5 percent if he introduced that client to Seldat. THE COURT: So, what is the point of having a 2 percent category? The 2 percent that -- Mr. Franco's MR. MUI: understanding of the 2 percent wasn't for maintenance of the account, it was for kind of what we discussed earlier, the residuals of a relationship that if the relationship was ended -- and when I say relationship, I mean between Mr. Franco's company and Seldat.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MUI: -- he would be entitled to a percentage of 2 percent.

THE COURT: Forever?

MR. MUI: Correct. But that doesn't --

THE COURT: You dropped that portion.

MR. MUI: Right. The numbers don't include that.

1 THE COURT: So that makes your claim simple. 2 MR. MUI: Right. 3 THE COURT: Your claim is that for every account that 4 was introduced or brought in by Mr. Franco, he was entitled to 5 5 percent of the billings that went to that client through the 6 day the relationship terminated. 7 MR. MUI: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: And nothing thereafter. 8 9 MR. MUI: Right. 10 THE COURT: And the defendants take a difference view. 11 Can you give me your elevator speech, Ms. Fenelon? 12 MS. FENELON: My client is the best to explain it but 13 this is what I understand and it is the culture of the company. 14 The person, the sales person who bring the account in will have 15 the percentage what is in the contract with them. THE COURT: 5 percent. 16 17 MS. FENELON: I was talking generally, but in this contract it would be 5 percent. And then, if there are other 18 accounts that he is maintaining, he gets 2 percent of that. 19 20 THE COURT: So he would get then 2 percent on accounts 21 that were already there before he got there? 22 MS. FENELON: And he is maintaining. 23 THE COURT: But which he then had to manage. 24 That's my understanding. MS. FENELON: Yes. 25 THE COURT: So he would potentially, under your theory

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of the world, Mr. Franco's company would potentially be 1 entitled to 2 percent commission on accounts he did not 2 3 originate himself? 4 He was national sales manager, correct? 5 MS. FENELON: I believe so. THE COURT: It says that that's his title. 6 7 MS. FENELON: I believe so. 8 THE COURT: Actually, does it say that? 9 MR. MUI: I think it was just sales manager. 10 THE COURT: It says: Your chief responsibility is to 11 lead Seldat's American sales effort so he was the head sales 12 person in America. 13 Did that mean that he was responsive, he was entitled to a 2 percent cut on all of the American accounts? 14 MS. FENELON: My client is the best but let's say 15 16 this. Let's say it is a major client, right, and Franco brings 17 NSI in. NSI have multiple service that he wants to -- NSI 18 would have multiple service needs from Seldat and let's say 19 Franco brings NSI in for warehousing and later on NSI decides 20 to ask for staffing. 21 Those new accounts, Franco would have 2 percent of 22 That's what I mean to say. 23 THE COURT: And what about let's take NSI out of the

picture, let's propose client X who was already a Seldat client

for, let's say, warehousing before Mr. Franco got there. Would

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requested from Mr. Franco.

Mr. Franco be entitled to any commission on client X? 1 MS. FENELON: If he did not bring the client in and is 2 3 not working with the client, no. 4 THE COURT: And how do you tell if he is "working with 5 the client?" MS. FENELON: He would introduce the client and then 6 7 that client would provide service. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MS. FENELON: Would request additional service, then 10 that's the additional new account. 11 THE COURT: Does it matter who the client called up when the client asked for additional service? Does it matter 12 13 whether the client called Mr. Franco or called Mr. Dadoun? 14 MS. FENELON: Yes, it would matter. THE COURT: So, if his relationship was with 15 16 Mr. Franco and Mr. Franco was the one he called up and said, 17 Joseph, I would like to expand my services that I purchase from 18 Seldat, then it would be 5 percent to Mr. Franco? 19 MS. FENELON: 2 percent, because it was 5 percent 20 already, 2 percent for additional services. 21 THE COURT: I think that's different from what you 22 told me a moment ago. It is possible that I'm the person who 23 is confused now but I thought you started out by telling me

that it was 2 percent on add-on services that were not directly

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into staffing --

1 MS. FENELON: No, your Honor. I apologize. 2 If a customer, if Franco brings in a customer for a 3 particular service, he is entitled to 5 percent of that. 4 THE COURT: Correct. I mean correct, I follow you. 5 MS. FENELON: If that customer later on requested 6 additional service and Franco is the one that he is asking the 7 service from, managing that service, he is entitled to 2 8 percent. 9 THE COURT: And if the customer asks for additional 10 services from Mr. Dadoun or someone else, that's --MS. FENELON: That's the sales person for that 11 12 service. 13 THE COURT: And that's what the company meant by 14 maintenance accounts. 15 MS. FENELON: Maintenance account. 16 And also I would say, your Honor, you did give an 17 example earlier, you said that if Franco had nothing to do at 18 the beginning with a customer and the customer requests additional service from Franco, Franco would be entitled to 19 20 that 2 percent even though he wasn't the one to bring it. 21 THE COURT: So, if customer X was already a Seldat 22 customer before Mr. Franco got there but Mr. Franco gets to 23 know the customer, the customer trusts Mr. Franco, the customer 24 calls Mr. Franco up directly and says I would like to expand

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MS. FENELON: It was more likes a sales pitch. Franco would go have to sell the services. THE COURT: So Franco calls the customer. MS. FENELON: Yes; this is what we have to offer, would you like to come? THE COURT: And in your view he would get 2 percent on that additional business? MS. FENELON: Yes. THE COURT: From an existing customer. MS. FENELON: That's what I understand from my client but he is the best to explain it. THE COURT: And the evidence of your view of what the contract meant will be Mr. Dadoun's testimony and the testimony of your other witnesses, correct? MS. FENELON: Yes. THE COURT: Do you have any other documentary evidence, e-mails for example, that are consistent or supportive of your view of what the contract actually was? MS. FENELON: It's the customer of the company, that's how they pay their sales person and how they envision the company and business. So, I don't believe I have more than their testimony. THE COURT: So it is just testimony? MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. These cases are difficult where it

1 is he-said-he-said.

MR. MUI: Yes.

THE COURT: And there is no documentary evidence that really leans heavily one way or the other. Let's see if I had any other questions...

On the defamation claim, the plaintiff's claim for defamation, I understand Mr. Dadoun sent out an e-mail that was fairly uncomplimentary of Mr. Franco and sent it, as I understand it, to a group of customers.

MS. FENELON: His customers, yes.

THE COURT: The defenses are, first, Ms. Fenelon, the common interest privilege. Explain what the common interest was there.

MS. FENELON: The customer was Seldat customers and Franco -- Daniel Dadoun sent an e-mail after Franco sent an e-mail to all these customers. I think I explain it better in my proposed conclusion of law but the customers belonged to Seldat and Daniel was acting as the CEO of the company to undo the damages done by Franco when he sent the e-mail the day before.

THE COURT: That's not the common interest privilege.

The common interest privilege is a qualified privilege that may protect otherwise actionable defamatory statements if they are made among and between people who are similar are similarly situated and need the information for a similar reason. For

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example, some of the classic situations in which you see the common interest defense asserted, if a group of managers is considering whether to hire someone, information about that someone can be circulated among them because they need it do their job. If the members of a college admissions committee are meeting to determine whether to admit an applicant, they have a common interest. If the members of a board of directors are considering some business deal as to which they need to evaluate somebody's credibility or character or what have you, they have a common interest.

What is the common interest between the defendant corporation and its CEO Mr. Dadoun and that corporation's customers?

MS. FENELON: The common interest is the business, they do it together. It is that the service they're providing -- the customer needs the service and Seldat is the one providing those services and the action from Franco would endanger that service.

THE COURT: Okay.

Turning to the counterclaims, your first counterclaim is for recovery of overpaid commissions in the amount of \$600,000. Can you give me your elevator speech on how you calculate that and what might have prompted your client to overpay and not notice?

MS. FENELON: According to my client he, the

IC55skiC conference commission was set based on expected sales that a sales person 1 2 would bring in and there was a draw that was given out. 3 THE COURT: The draw was \$144,000 a year. 4 MS. FENELON: Yes, and it is based on expected sales 5 and, according to my client, he pays Franco based on promises 6 that he is going to bring sales and the sales that Franco 7 brought in do not equate to the commission that he paid him and 8 so that's why he became overpaid. 9 THE COURT: Over the four years, approximately, that 10 the relationship persisted, how much above and beyond his draw 11 did Mr. Franco actually get paid? 12 MS. FENELON: I don't have that information. 13 about five hundred something, probably. 14 THE COURT: So that's the entire amount that you are now trying to claw back, everything above the draw? 15 16 MS. FENELON: Say that again, please? 17 THE COURT: Well, his draw was \$12,000 a month or 18 \$144,000 a year, correct? 19 MS. FENELON: Yes. 20 THE COURT: And you are saying he was paid commission

THE COURT: And you are saying he was paid commission above that in the amount of over \$500,000 which also is roughly the amount that you now say you are entitled to get back. Are you saying that Mr. Franco didn't earn any commission that cleared his draw?

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MS. FENELON: Not any. He was paid about \$1.3 million

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or \$1.4 million.

THE COURT: Of which you wish to get back \$572,000.

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: Which suggests to me that he was entitled to be paid about \$900,000.

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: Which about \$600,000 of which was his draw over four years and a couple of extra thousand -- I am doing rough math in my head -- must have been commission above the draw, right?

MS. FENELON: I'm sorry, your Honor?

THE COURT: I am sorry if I am not being clear.

Your view of the world is that the draw was a draw against commission, correct?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: That he didn't start getting commission checks until his 5 percent or his 2 percent, whatever the case may be, added up to more than his draw, right, like an advance on a novel?

MS. FENELON: Yes.

THE COURT: You don't start getting royalty payments until you have earned your advance and Mr. Franco, in your view of the world, didn't start getting commission payments until he had heard more than he was getting his draw.

MS. FENELON: My, just so I can be clear, my view of

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the world is that we -- Seldat -- paid him \$1.something million 1 500 K of that he did not earn. 2 dollars. 3 THE COURT: I understand that. But if he didn't earn 4 500 K of 1.4 then he did earn 900,000. 5 MS. FENELON: Remaining. 6 THE COURT: Roughly. 7 MS. FENELON: Yes. THE COURT: Which is more than his draw. 8 9 MS. FENELON: Yes. 10 THE COURT: So he must have earned some commission 11 above and beyond his draw. 12 MS. FENELON: Yes. Based on --13 THE COURT: And what you are telling me, I assume, is 14 that your client, through Mr. Dadoun, somehow never actually 15 did the math during the entire four years that Mr. Franco was there and just wrote, what, estimated checks? 16 17 MS. FENELON: No, your Honor. That's not what I'm 18 saying. THE COURT: What calculation was done? 19 20 MS. FENELON: Yes. The calculation was done but there 21 was a situation where Franco was involved in setting -- they 22 had some kind of relationship where my client will be the 23 benefit to explain that, your Honor.

his affidavit. That's why I am asking you.

THE COURT: Well, because he hasn't explained it in

Case 1:16-cv-08709-BCM Document 167 Filed 02/01/19 Page 47 of 56 IC55skiC conference MS. FENELON: I don't believe he -- I don't believe he 1 did not calculate any number and I think --2 3 THE COURT: How is he going establish at trial that he 4 is owed \$572.960.71 back? 5 MS. FENELON: I think he believes it is based on the 6 commission that he paid. 7 Sure, but he is going to have to show us THE COURT: 8 the math, you know. Is he going to be able to do that? Client 9 by client, percentage by percentage? 10 MS. FENELON: That's what his position is, your Honor, 11 so I assume that he is going to be able to show it. 12 THE COURT: But you don't know what it is based on as 13

we sit here today.

MS. FENELON: No, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. There is a defamation counterclaim as well and the defamation counterclaim is based on the plaintiff publishes his original complaint in this action, not publishing by filing it on ECF, but publish it by I guess sending it around town to customers. The plaintiff alleged that that is privileged because it was in a complaint. You understand there is case law to the effect that what you say in the complaint is privileged but if you then put your complaint on Facebook or on e-mail or in the newspaper rather than waiting for some enterprising journalist to do that for you, that you lose the privilege.

1 You are aware of that risk, right? MR. MUI: I'm aware now. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. Simply putting it in a complaint 4 the first time doesn't give you carte blanche. 5 MR. MUI: Understood. 6 THE COURT: To republish it and to put the rest of the 7 world under protection privilege. MR. MUI: Understood. 8 9 THE COURT: So, you have some risk there. The most 10 potentially defamatory statement in the original complaint was 11 the allegation, and let me see if I have this straight, that 12 Seldat itself was behind a theft of goods from complainant's 13 warehouse. 14 MR. MUI: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Is that the allegation. 16 MR. MUI: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Is it true? 18 MR. MUI: Is it a true statement that Seldat was behind that? 19 20 THE COURT: Yes. How are you going to prove it, in 21 other words. 22 MR. MUI: Through testimony. 23 THE COURT: Because you have to -- I mean, 24 technically, Ms. Fenelon has to prove that it is false because 25 falsity is an element of a defamation claim but particularly in

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on your witness list?

a bitch of trial we will certainly expect to see evidence of truth from the defendant, or in this case the counter-defendant. MR. MUI: We would offer testimony from Mr. Franco. THE COURT: Does he have any firsthand knowledge of that? MR. MUI: Firsthand? THE COURT: What happened in that warehouse. MR. MUI: He was informed as to what happened at the warehouse. Did he see it happen? THE COURT: If he was informed as to what happened to the warehouse that may potentially, depending on how it is presented, be admissible as to malice. MR. MUI: Right. THE COURT: But not as to the truth of the matter asserted. MR. MUI: Right. THE COURT: So how are you going to prove, if you think you can, that those statements were true? MR. MUI: There was no other avenue, Judge, sitting here today, where I could offer a document or other testimony that would substantiate the truth of that other than what Mr. Franco would have to offer. THE COURT: The person who told Mr. Franco that is not

| MR. MUI: No. No.  |
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| THE COURT: And Ms. Fenelon, how are you going to                |
| prove that statement was false?                                 |
| MS. FENELON: First, my witness will tell that you he            |
| wasn't arrested and there were no thefts.                       |
| THE COURT: And there was no theft or the theft was              |
| not committed.  |
| MS. FENELON: There was no theft as well either. The             |
| theft was not committed by Seldat either, if there was one, but |
| there was no theft.   |
| THE COURT: It wasn't my dog, and if it wasn't my dog            |
| he wasn't in your yard. If he was in your yard, he didn't dig   |
| that hole.  |
| MS. FENELON: There was no arrest, there are no                  |
| THE COURT: I will assume that Mr. Dadoun is competent           |
| to testify about whether he was ever arrested. Is he competent  |
| to testify about whether there was a theft after at a           |
| warehouse?  |
| MS. FENELON: Yes, he is.  |
| THE COURT: Does he have firsthand knowledge?                    |
| MS. FENELON: He would because he was the CEO and he             |
| was involved with the operation, and also one of my witness is  |
| involved in the operation as well.                              |

THE COURT: So one of your --

MS. FENELON: Two of my witnesses.

1 THE COURT: So, two witnesses will speak to that 2 point. 3 Turning back to plaintiffs again who are counterclaim 4 defendants as to this point, what is the basis for the claim 5 that Mr. Dadoun was arrested? 6 MR. MUI: Again, Judge, it was information provided to 7 Mr. Franco. I can't speak as to why that allegation was made in the amended complaint, that was made by predecessor counsel. 8 9 THE COURT: I see that is not made in the current 10 complaint. 11 Right. Other than what Mr. Franco was 12 informed of. I don't know how deep you want to get into the 13 facts here but. 14 THE COURT: Well let's assume, hypothetically 15 speaking, that the only testimony on the truth of the matter comes from Mr. Dadoun and he says I was never arrested and 16 there is no testimony or other admissible evidence on that 17 18 point. So now your client has made a false statement. 19 MR. MUI: Right. 20 THE COURT: And since Mr. Dadoun is not a public 21 figure, at least there is no such allegation that's been made 22 in this case, it is essentially a negligence standard, common

MR. MUI: Right.

law defamation.

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THE COURT: So, what is your client's defense to

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making this defamatory per se charge, which let's presume for purposes of this conversation, turns out not to be true and unquestionably is well calculated to damage his business reputation?

MR. MUI: Well, I think if you heard the circumstances surrounding why Mr. Franco sent that e-mail with his complaint attached he was getting calls from clients of his saying what's going on there? Are you involved with any of this? There is products missing and, you know, you work there. What is going on?

THE COURT: I am not aware of any case law or other precedent for the proposition that you are allowed to commit defamation when you are under siege. Are you?

MR. MUI: No.

THE COURT: So let's stick to the actual defamation charge.

Initially, Judge, our defense was going to MR. MUI: be that these were allegations made in the complaint, that clearly I need to do a little more research on that portion of it now after your instruction earlier today. I don't have, other than truth and allegations made in the complaint, I don't have another defense.

THE COURT: You may want to give that some thought.

MR. MUI: Yes.

THE COURT: Turning back to the

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defendant/counterclaimant on this defamation issue, what are your damages, Ms. Fenelon?

MS. FENELON: Damages, as I cited in my proposed conclusion of law, is that defamation per se, when you accuse someone, make a false statement about, like accuse someone of criminal activities, damage doesn't necessarily be played there but --

THE COURT: But that means I would have discretion to award damages in a nominal amount. So, if you want more than that, it would be helpful if you actually had some loss of business or something concrete.

MS. FENELON: Why. So, a lot of our customers have walked away from us, and I said ours because I am in-house counsel that's why I say "ours."

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. FENELON: A lot of our customers have walked away or some of them actually claim they don't want to pay us and claim that we have been told about your policy or they are actually removing themselves from us. So, we have lost a lot of business from that.

THE COURT: And you can tie that to this particular e-mail?

MS. FENELON: Some of these customers are from our -THE COURT: My point is you do have to connect the
dots. You can't say every account that we lost since that

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e-mail was sent must have been as a result of that e-mail. 1 2 MS. FENELON: No, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Or that distribution of the complaint. 4 MS. FENELON: That's what I would be attempting to 5 prove. 6 THE COURT: You have to show causation. 7 MS. FENELON: Yes. THE COURT: And not perfect evidence but reliable 8 9 evidence as to the amount of the loss, not in revenue but in 10 profit, if that's going to be the allegation, that you lost 11 profits on account of this. 12 Anything else I haven't covered, plaintiffs? 13 MR. MUI: Nothing. 14 THE COURT: Defendants? 15 Well, this discussion was helpful to me. It gave me 16 some ideas both for the questions the Court may want to ask at 17 trial and it is my practice to, after the lawyers have asked 18 their questions to, in a bench trial, I will ask the witness 19 some questions myself so just be aware of that. It gives me 20 some help in what to look out for in the testimony and in the 21 documentary evidence, and I hope it may have started the 22 parties thinking about sensible ways in which this dispute may 23 be settled before we start at 11:30. 24 MR. MUI: Judge, I just have one guestion.

If we go back and do research on certain issues that

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your Honor raised today, would we be permitted to amend our proposed findings of fact and law?

THE COURT: At the conclusion of the evidence I will allow the parties to make a pitch to me for that and we will see where we are, at that point, in terms of whether anything truly new has come up that would warrant a supplement.

MR. MUI: Okay.

THE COURT: Anything further today?

MR. MUI: No, thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Fenelon?

MS. FENELON: No.

THE COURT: All right. What time deadlines did I give you? Ms. Fenelon, you are going to serve your supplemental deposition excerpt by Friday.

MS. FENELON: By Friday, yes.

THE COURT: And the plaintiffs are going to make any objections that they have no later than --

MR. MUI: Wednesday.

THE COURT: Right. When you get to court at 9:30 on Wednesday morning and you can put that in writing in the way you have done in the original joint pretrial statement, please, with a little, you know, a little chart.

MR. MUI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: And then at 9:30 we will convene with no court reporter and see where we are settlement-wise. And at

| 1  | 11:30, if we can't settle the case, we will go on the record |
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| 2  | and we will try the case, beginning with Mr. Franco as the   |
| 3  | first witness.   |
| 4  | MS. FENELON: And you want us to submit binders by            |
| 5  | Tuesday?   |
| 6  | THE COURT: Yes. I want you to send the binders to            |
| 7  | chambers by close of business Tuesday, earlier if you can.   |
| 8  | Please make an effort to consolidate so there is just one    |
| 9  | binder and not two because, otherwise, we waste time looking |
| 10 | for the right binder.  |
| 11 | Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.                   |
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